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Abstract—The influence of hidden additional information
concerning the circumstances of input data acquisition on the
quality of decisions based on the data is considered. An ana-
logue to the intuition influencing natural decision making is
indicated. The problem of contextual information in decision
making based on Bayes rule, on reference data sets in various
applications as well as of scene analysis by numerous examples
is illustrated.
Keywords—decision making, hidden information, intuition, pat-
tern recognition, scene analysis.
1. Introduction
Since the very beginning of the pattern recognition de-
velopment as a scientiﬁc discipline (i.e., since the middle
of 1950’s) many attempts were made to make the artiﬁ-
cial pattern recognition methods as eﬀective as the nat-
ural one were made. Till now, the early expectations of
a possible quick reaching this goal by using the approaches
to pattern recognition based on artiﬁcial neural networks,
geometrical, statistical, formal linguistic, algebraic or any
other advanced types of models and based on them algo-
rithms only partially came to be true. In many application
areas (e.g., in medical diagnosis, biology, criminology, geo-
physics, etc.) a veriﬁcation of the computer-aided pattern
recognition results by those of human pattern recognition
takes place rather than the reverse. Such a situation exists
not only because of a much lower number of artiﬁcial neu-
ral networks’ elements than this of the neurons in a natural
human brain or because of too low computer performance
rates, but also because of an imperfection of the actually
available artiﬁcial recognition models and methods. One
of the human mind’s properties which in the to-date ar-
tiﬁcial intelligence methods is neglected is the intuition.
The diagnoses made by the experienced medical special-
ists, even if based on apparently similar or the same input
diagnostic data, are usually more accurate than those made
by the low-experienced physicians as well as those made by
the computer-aided diagnostic systems. This fact is usually
explained by the intuition supporting the experienced spe-
cialist’s thinking and by a lack of the intuition in the two
other cases.
Many attempts to explain the phenomenon of intuition
were made by the philosophers (e.g., by Aristotle, Plato,
R. Descartes, I. Kant, J. Locke, H. Bergson, etc.) [1].
They assumed a primacy of intuitive cognitive process over
the one based on the observations. On the other hand,
L. Wittgenstein assumed that such metaphysical concepts
as intuition in scientiﬁc researches should not be taken into
considerations [2]. This point of view on the intuition was
shared by some naturalists in the past century (e.g., by
J. B. Watson and other authors representing a behavioural
approach in psychology [3]). Nevertheless, many examples
of subconscious processes existence in human thinking and
of their inﬂuence on human behaviour can be shown [4].
S. Freud tried to explain many aspects of human behav-
ior by subconscious mental processes [5]. The role of the
intuition in creative thinking and in discoveries was ana-
lyzed by many authors, like R. S. Siegler and E. Stern [6],
A. Motycka [7], M. Polanyi [8] and, in particular, in
mathematics by B. L. J. Brouwer [9], J. Hadamard [10].
A simple deﬁnition of intuition as “. . .a direct, by a pre-
liminary analysis and/or reasoning not preceded knowl-
edge about something. . .” is given in [11]. Similarly,
D. G. Myers [4] deﬁnes intuition as our “ability to getting
access to immediate knowledge, prompt inspection into it
without observations or reasoning”. A. P. Wierzbicki [12]
formulates the most general, intuition concerning question:
“. . .what is intuition: is it a supernatural ability of human
mind distinguishing it from animals and producing infalli-
ble truths or is it rather a very powerful but natural ability,
common with animals, producing new ideas but such that
require justiﬁcation and evaluation?”.
The paper presented below is an extended version of a non-
published plenary speech delivered at the 7th International
Conference on Computer Recognition Systems CORES
held in Wrocław, Poland, in May of 2011. The following
problem is here considered: is intuition a natural mental
property worthy and possible to be simulated by artiﬁcial
decision making systems? If so, then neglecting any its
metaphysical aspects, what could it mean from an infor-
mation processing point of view? In the context of the
main problem the following particular items are considered
below: a working deﬁnition of intuition based on informa-
tional approach is proposed in Section 2. Inﬂuence of ad-
ditional information on the decisions based on Bayes rule
are described in Section 3. Similar problem concerning
pattern recognition based on reference sets is considered
in Section 4. The role of contextual information in scene
analysis is shortly illustrated in Section 5. Conclusions are
formulated in Section 6.
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2. Intuition – a Working Concept
Before answering the ﬁrst of the above formulated questions
two remarks should be made:
1) The hidden intuitive mechanisms governing creative
(e.g., mathematical, artistic, musical, etc.) thinking are dif-
ferent from those inﬂuencing animal or human behavior in
suddenly arising situations. In the ﬁrst case, a sort of un-
conscious evoking and associating of possible solutions of
a problem, while in the second case rather evoking some
remembered in the past similar situations and their eﬀects
take place. In addition, the results in both cases are diﬀer-
ent. In the ﬁrst case, it is an “illumination”, i.e., a sudden
thought about a possible problem solution, while in the
second case it may be an impression of an irrational fear,
disapproval, distrust, etc., or in an opposite case it may take
the form of a hope, belief, conﬁdence, etc. The last type of
intuition has been created, probably by a natural evolution,
as a form of adaptation of living beings to a necessity of
eﬀectively react to unexpected events of high living impor-
tance: a danger of an attack, an occurrence of a potential
sexual partner, a possibility of food reaching, etc.
2) Not all intuitively suggested decisions are cor-
rect or useful. D. G. Myers [4] describes numerous
examples of wrong decisions inspired by intuition. In par-
ticular, he remarks that mathematically optimal decisions
diﬀer essentially from intuitive decisions based on the most
impressive, similar to the present one cases. A noise heard
in darkness not always is caused by a wild animal; a smile
not always means that somebody is well predisposed to us.
Our ﬁrst impression after arrival to an unknown town is
not always correct. The examples show that our intuitive
reaction to sudden event is not always justiﬁed in a given
situation, sometimes it may be evidently unfavourable or
wrong.
The simulation of intuition in artiﬁcial decision making
systems, if possible, is thus desirable only if it helps in
system’s action improving or in its better decisions mak-
ing. For this (and in particular, for pattern recognition)
purpose an informational model of intuition seems to be
suitable. Intuition can thus be deﬁned as an ability of
a subject to unintended admission, in certain attending side-
circumstances, aﬀecting his (its) behavior or decisions by
remembered impact of analogous circumstances on experi-
enced in the past situations.
The informational model of intuition is schematically pre-
sented in Fig. 1. It shows that the behavior of a subject and
following from it eﬀects evoked by the same stimulus may
be diﬀerent, because of neglecting or unconscious taking
into account additional information about the circumstances
attending the stimuli. This corresponds to the well known
situations of some human decisions that are assessed as
“irrational” by other people, because they subconsciously
have been aﬀected by information that is unavailable to
other people, kept in the mind of the decision making
subject.
Fig. 1. Informational model of subject’s behaviour aﬀected by
intuition.
Side-circumstances in Fig. 1 mean in this context that in-
formation about them has not been directly included into
the decision rules. Otherwise speaking, they constitute
a sort of informational context of decisions made under
incompleteness of information. Intuition reduces the infor-
mation incompleteness level by taking into account addi-
tional information about the circumstances which may mod-
ify the decision. Therefore, an additional (hidden) informa-
tion may aﬀect the recognition and increase its quality. In
the nature, past information inﬂuence on human behavior
is connected with sub cortical informational processes in
the mind. In computer systems such inﬂuence may con-
sist in automatic (i.e., hidden for the user) registration of
data concerning circumstances attending current decision-
making, and in using them in future pattern recognition
acts. The concept of including programs that automatically
start operations into the computer system is not new; each
operational system contains many hidden operations pro-
tecting the user against errors, and application programs
contain operations protecting against data misusing. The
question is whether the above-mentioned cases example an
“intuition” of the computer systems. It seems not as they
are limited only to an automatic formal analysis of input
data or to a hidden control of the calculating operations.
As a more advanced case, it can be mentioned the
M. Minsky’s concept of “daemons”, special procedures
included into the knowledge representing systems based on
“frames”. The role of “daemons” consists in automatic
completing the contents of frames by lacking elements,
explicitly to the system not provided but existing in the
input data in a hidden form [13]. However, even in this
case additional information does not concern the circum-
stances attending the past decisions of the system. Close to
the “artiﬁcial intuition” concept is this of information re-
trieval systems equipped by the mechanisms of the replies
modiﬁcation by taking into account the currently modiﬁed
informational proﬁles of the users [14]. From the user’s
point of view, the system able to guess the probable user’s
requirements for information is equipped with a sort of
“intuition”. However, this “intuition” is limited to user’s
preferences only. Below, a more general case of “intu-
ition” consisting in aﬀecting the current pattern recognition
by the information about the circumstances of past pattern
recognition acts will be considered. Taking into account
that additional information aﬀecting current decisions are
based on collected in the past experiences, the “artiﬁcial
intuition”-based information systems can be considered as
a sort of self-learning systems. However, like in natural
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intuition, this additional information may be charged with
a dose of uncertainty.
3. Bayes-Rule-Based Pattern
Recognition
The Bayes-rule based pattern recognition methods belong
to the most early elaborated ones [15]. The simplest case
of two recognized classes of objects (patterns), C1 and C2
will be here reminded. Let U denote a multidimensional
vector space whose elements (vectors) u represent the ob-
jects of a given physical nature. It is assumed that the
object occurs randomly. Hence, the classes C1, C2 can be
described, respectively, by the conditional probability den-
sities v(u|C1), v(u|C2) and by their a priori probabilities
p1, p2 where p1 + p2 ≡ 1. We deﬁne a decision function
as a function assigning to any vector u ∈U of, as one of
the two above-mentioned classes:
χ : U →{C1,C2}. (1)
Let us also denote by P1|2 a conditional probability of recog-
nition of an object u as belonging to C1 when, in fact,
it belongs to C2, and by P2|1 a conditional probability of
recognition u as belonging to C2 when, in fact, it belongs
to C1. The optimal Bayes sense decision function χ(u) is
the one that minimizes the mean decision risk:
R = P1|2 + P2|1 . (2)
It is known [15] that such function should have the form:
χ(u) =
{
C1 if λ (u) > Λ,
C2 if λ ((u) < Λ,
(3)
(if λ (u) = Λ any of two decisions is admissible), where
λ (u) is a pre-decision function:








is a threshold level [15]. In the simplest case, if P1 = P2 = P
it is Λ = 1 and the rule (3) takes a simpler form:
χ(u) =
{
C1 if v(u|C1) > v(u|C2) ,
C2 if v(u|C1) < v(u|C2) ,
(6)
as it (in a one-dimensional case) is illustrated in Fig. 2.
For Λ0 = 1 a threshold point u0 between the C1 and C2
decision areas, according to Eq. (6) is given by the equa-
tion v(u|C1) = v(u|C2). In such case, the decision risk R is
equal to the sum of the areas under the curve v(u|C1) for
u > u0 and under the v(u|C2) for u < u0. Till now, no “in-
tuition” aﬀects the decision. However, let us assume that
Fig. 2. Bayesian pattern (signal) recognition rule.
for certain reasons, the errors consisting the recognition of
C2 instead of C1 lead to much larger “costs” than recogni-
tion of C1 instead of C2. In such case, a user intuitively
may believe that it is better to shift the threshold point from
u0 to u
′, u0 < u
′, as shown in Fig. 2. Evidently, the risk R
given by Eq. (2) is in this case increased (as being equal
to the sum of the gray areas in Fig. 2). It can be shown
that it corresponds now to a new threshold value Λ in the








where r1|2/r2|1 denotes a relative cost assigned to the errors
of the “C1 instead of C2” with respect to this of “C2 in-
stead of C1” type. This relative cost can be assessed due
to remembered eﬀects (e.g., for the user) of wrong deci-
sions made in the past, i.e., of connected with them cir-
cumstances.
The above-presented example of intuitive cautiousness in-
ﬂuence on pattern recognition can easily be extended on
more realistic, parametric Bayesian decision rules. For this
purpose, it will be assumed that the conditional probability
density functions of input signal have the form v(u|C1;γ1),
v(u|C2;γ2), where a binary recognition problem once again
is considered and γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ, Γ being a set of passive pa-
rameters, i.e., unknown parameters specifying the form of
probability distribution. Despite the fact that passive pa-
rameters directly don’t carry any useful information, their
knowledge improves the quality of the decision-making
rule [16]. The pre-decision function under passive param-
eter takes the form:
λ (u) = v(u|C1; γ1)
v(u|C2; γ2)
, (8)
where the values γ1, γ2 ∈ Γ in a classical Bayes decision
rule are exactly known, but in a more general case it may
be only approximately given. However, let us assume that
a decision maker is, due to his experience, convinced that
a perceptible increment (decrement) ∆β of external param-
eters (circumstances) may cause the corresponding changes
of the passive parameters γ1, γ2. He doesn’t know any ex-
act functional dependence between the increments ∆β and
those of the passive parameters. However, for any given ∆β
one expects that ∆γ may be positive or negative, its value
may be small (S), moderate (M) or large (L) or it may
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be negligible (N). One interprets the last notions as some
fuzzy variables characterized by their membership functions
in the L. Zadeh sense [17], as illustrated in Fig. 3. This jus-
tiﬁes a correction of the pre-decision function according to
the formula:
λ ′(u) = v(u|C1; γ1 + ∆γ1)
v(u|C2; γ2 + ∆γ2)
, (9)
the values ∆γ1, ∆γ2 being chosen as those maximizing
the membership functions µ(∆γ) of the fuzzy variables
(S, L, M or N).
Fig. 3. Membership functions of fuzzy sets describing assumed
relative external parameter’s inﬂuence on passive parameter in-
crements: N – negligible, S – small, M – moderate, L – large.
An intuitive correction of probability distribution parame-
ters describing similarity classes can be illustrated by the
following example.
Let’s assume that in order to detect the most dangerous
points on the roads in a town several points of road traf-
ﬁc monitoring have been selected. The vehicles’ veloc-
ity was measured and the corresponding histograms have
been calculated. Two classes of points: C0 – non-dangerous
and C1 – dangerous have been assumed to exist and to be
recognized according to the following rule: a point belongs
to C0 if no more than 50% of passing vehicles exceed the
speed limits, otherwise it belongs to C1. According to the
classiﬁcation rule, the medians m of the velocity histograms
h(V ) for each monitoring point Pi, i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , were cal-
culated and the classiﬁcation rule took the form:
Pi ∈C0 if mi <V0i,
Pi ∈C1 if mi ≥V0i,
where mi is a calculated median and V0i is a previously
established speed limit for the given monitoring point i.
However, several histograms of the same median may be
of diﬀerent form, as illustrated in Fig. 4. The histogram A
Fig. 4. Approximated histograms of car velocities in the roads;
admissible speed limit = 100%.
is characterized by high asymmetry (skewness) and low
ﬂatness (kurtosis), while histogram B is rather symmetrical
and more compact. An experience tells us that the type
A histogram corresponds to the more dangerous situation
than B because it shows that a relatively great rate of ve-
hicles exceeding the speed limits on an extremely high
level. As a consequence, a point Pi satisfying the condi-
tion mi < V0i and thus classiﬁed as Pi ∈C0 in fact, should
be reclassiﬁed as Pi ∈C1 if it is found that its skewness is
high-positive.
4. Pattern Recognition Based
on Reference Sets
The reference (learning) sets are widely used in pattern
recognition in methods based on the assumption that a func-
tional description of patterns (similarity classes) is not pos-
sible a priori. Reference sets can thus be deﬁned as sets
of correctly classiﬁed objects representing the similarity
classes. It is assumed that the reference sets S1, S2, . . . , SN ,
where N is the number of recognized patterns, are mutually
disjoint ﬁnite subsets of the observation spaceU unambigu-
ously assigned to the similarity classes. Recognition of an
object u consists in indication of the closest element to u
in a certain set reference set Sn, n ∈ [1, 2, . . . , N]. How-
ever, the reference sets can be collected in various ways.
It is illustrated by Fig. 5 where composition of reference
sets Sr, Sc is shown, representing, respectively, two clas-
ses of objects denoted symbolically by “rhombs” () and
“circles” (•).
Fig. 5. Collection of reference sets as sums of subsets provided
from two independent sources.
In this example it is assumed that the reference sets have
been obtained by summing the corresponding subsets:
S′r∪S′′r and S′c∪S′′c collected independently in two diﬀerent
external circumstances attending the observations shown on
the planes Σ′ and Σ′′. Straight lines L′ and L′′ separate the
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subsets S′r and S′c collected on Σ′ as well as S′′r and S′′c col-
lected on Σ′. No straight line separates exactly the joined
subsets S′r ∪ S′′r from S′c ∪ s′′c (both, L′ and L′′ admit two
misclassiﬁcations).
Let’s assume that the next object, denoted by a “star” ⋆ has
been observed and should be classiﬁed. Evidently, it will
be classiﬁed as a “rhomb” if L′ and as a “circle” if L′′,
as a separating line is used. However, let us assume that
it is known that external circumstances of the “star” ob-
servation were closer to those attending the Σ′ than the Σ′′
circumstances. In such case it is reasonable to use the L′
separating line and to recognize the “star” as a “rhomb”.
The above-presented situation can also be diﬀerently inter-
preted. Diﬀerent credibility levels can be assigned to the
observations collected on Σ′ and Σ′′. For instance, we be-
lieve more that the data on Σ′ are correct than those on Σ′′.
The next “star” object can be recognized by using the “k
most similar objects” (k-MSO) approach. In such a case
a similarity measure σ(ωi, ω j) is deﬁned among the pairs
of objects in the observation space satisfying the standard
conditions [18]:
I. σ(ωi, l ωi)≡ 1,
II. σ(ωi ω j)≡ σ(ω j, ωi),
III. σ(ωi, ω j)σ(ω j, ωk)≤ σ(ωi, ω j).

 (10)
According to the k-MSO recognition rule, an observation
ωi is recognized as belonging to a similarity class Cn if
among k most similar to ωi objects in the reference set
Σ′ ∪Σ′′ most belong to S′n ∪ S′′n . However, if the elements
of Σ′′ are less credible than those of Σ′, the similarity mea-
sures between ωi and the elements of Σ′ should be taken
into account with a weight reducing their inﬂuence on the
recognition result. This can be done by replacing the value
σ(ωi, ω j) by σβ (ωi, ω j) where β > is a reducing the sim-
ilarity measure parameter.
The idea of taking a “hidden” inner structure of the ref-
erence sets into account has a particular importance in
computer-aided medical diagnosis.
As an example, the case of a reference set of total choles-
terol rates construction is presented. Data have been ex-
tracted from the records gathered in several dozens of ana-
Fig. 6. Construction of a rough set of total cholesterol rate
in patients of diﬀerent sex (F – female, M – male) and age.
The rough set indicated in the bottom-scale: black thick – surely
belonging values, grey thick – possibly belonging values, black
thin – surely not belonging values (data unpublished, provided by
prof. Jerzy Janecki).
lytical laboratories in Poland. The measured cholesterol
levels primarily have been grouped according to the ge-
ographical regions, sexuality and age of patients. Part of
the analysis results are shown in Fig. 6. The range of the
recorded cholesterol rates depends on both the sexuality and
the age of the patients. An averaged group of cases can be
obtained as an algebraic sum of the sets corresponding to
the particular cases. An interval D∗ = [150÷225] mg/dcl
is a common part of all particular intervals while D∗ =
[115÷285] mg/dcl is the minimal one covering all recorded
cases. Both intervals describe a rough set (in the Z. Pawlak
sense [19]) of total cholesterol levels occurring in all cate-
gories of human patients. However, for medical diagnosis
a set of “normal” cholesterol levels is desirable. For this
purpose, one can select from D∗ a “core” consisting of its
middle 3rd part, i.e, a sub-interval D = [175÷200] mg/dcl.
Then a pair of intervals




describes a rough reference set of cholesterol rates corre-
sponding to the patients “in norm”. A computer system
may decide that a patient is:
“certainly in norm” if his cholesterol rate belongs to D,
“possibly in norm” if it belongs to the diﬀerence D∗ D,
“certainly out of norm” if it does not belong to D∗.
However, the cases recognized as “probably in norm” can
be veriﬁed if the age and sexuality is taken into account
and speciﬁc rough reference sets are available instead of
the averaged one. For example, let us assume that the
patient is 80-year-old woman primarily as “probably in
norm” diagnosed. In this case a speciﬁed rough reference
set is given by a pair of intervals:
SF,80 = {[183÷227], [140÷270]}.
Fig. 7. Comparison of an averaged S and a speciﬁc SF, 80 rough
reference sets.
Fig. 8. Recognition of a “square” or a “cube projection” depend-
ing on the context.
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Fig. 9. Examples of scenes: (a) city view, (b) a garden view whose computer interpretation may lead to incorrect results.
In Fig. 7 the averaged and speciﬁc rough reference sets
are compared. In the case of using the averaged reference
set to medical diagnosis the “certainly in norm” interval is
relatively small. Any based on it medical diagnosis can be
corrected if the decision maker is able to use the speciﬁc
reference sets instead of the averaged one, and additional
information about the patient’s age and sexuality is taken
into consideration. It can be observed that in such a case
a correction may consist of replacing:
– some “certainly in norm” recognitions by “possibly
in norm”,
– some “possibly in norm” recognitions by “certainly
in norm” or by “certainly out of norm”.
The inﬂuence of contextual information on decision-making
can also be illustrated by an example of geometrical ﬁgures
recognition. In the upper row of ﬁgures shown in Fig. 8,
a square among the rectangles and the hexagons can easily
be recognized. However, in the lower-row context the same
ﬁgure rather as a projection of a cube among other cube
projections will be recognized.
It follows from the above-given examples that additional
information about the reference sets may substantially in-
ﬂuence the results of pattern recognition.
5. Scene Analysis
Scene analysis is a domain of pattern recognition where
contextual information plays a particularly important role.
A scene can be deﬁned as a collection of distinguishable
objects in a physical 3D space satisfying some geometrical
and/or topological relations. A correct image contents un-
derstanding and description needs without additional con-
textual knowledge (experience, intuition, etc.) is practically
impossible.
This can be illustrated by the examples presented in Fig. 9.
The image 9a can be recognized and described by an “in-
telligent” computer system as “A church tower and a house
of equal heights in a city environment”, while the image 9b
as “An old man’s face wearing glasses and two small hu-
man (dwarf?) ﬁgures on both its sides”. Only additional
information about 3D city perspective in the case of 9a
and possible design of a garden in the case of 9b makes
the correct interpretation of the images.
Hence, besides the basic input data, a correct decision mak-
ing system should thus, besides the basic input data, take
into account some additional data concerning a widely de-
ﬁned environment of the data source and of data acquisition
circumstances, as shown in Fig. 10. The problem is how
to control the process of additional data acquisition, stor-
age and selection for a given decision process. In natural
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Fig. 10. Recognition of a “square” or a “cube projection” de-
pending on the context.
thinking this is mostly a subconscious process. In artiﬁ-
cial decision-making systems it may be hidden to the user.
However, it should be a property programmed by the sys-
tem designers.
6. Conclusions
The role of intuition in human behavior has been known
since ages and a lot of concepts explaining the nature of
intuition has been proposed in the literature. From an infor-
mational point of view intuition can be considered as a sort
of additional information inﬂuencing decision making be-
sides the basic data taken into account by a decision-maker.
The numerous examples show that such additional informa-
tion may be substantial in the decision making quality. In
some cases a correct decision making without taking into
account additional information concerning the observed ob-
jects environment or data acquisition circumstances seems
impossible. On the other hand, inclusion into the decision
process additional information stored by the system can be
considered as a substitution of intuition in computer-aided
decision system, analogous to the natural intuition inﬂuenc-
ing the human decision making. The investigation of the
problem seems thus to be an open and important research
problem in computer applications.
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